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Abstract
We study the introduction of robo-advising on a large representa-
tive sample of Employee Saving Plans. Differently from many services
that fully automate portfolio decisions, our robo-advisor proposes in-
vestment and rebalancing strategies, leaving investors free to follow or
ignore them. We focus on the resulting human-robot interactions and
show that with the robo-service investors increase their attention to
the portfolio, their investment in the plan, their equity exposure. They
experience higher risk-adjusted returns, mostly by changing their re-
balancing so to stay closer to the target. These effects are robust across
various specifications accounting for the endogeneity of the take-up de-
cision, and they are stronger for investors with smaller portfolios, lower
baseline returns and stock market participation. Our results suggest
that automated advice can promote financial inclusion, and they high-
light how human-robot interactions can influence investors’ portfolio
decisions and possibly improve financial capability.
Keywords: Robo-Advising, Human-robot Interaction, Financial
Inclusion, Portfolio Dynamics, Long-Term Investment.
JEL codes: G11; G51; G41; G23; D14.
∗We are grateful to Francesco D’Acunto, Francesco D’Amuri, Laurent Bach, Pascal
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Households are increasingly required to take complex financial decisions, and
not all of them appear well equipped (Campbell (2006), Lusardi and Mitchell
(2014)). While delegating to financial experts may help (Von Gaudecker
(2015)), in practice financial advice has its limits. It is costly and, as it has
been shown, it does not always serve clients’ best interest.1
In this context, a growing interest has emerged both in academia and
in the industry for automated financial advisors, often called robo-advisors.
Yet, even if a robot may be devised to reduce transaction costs and agency
conflicts, the fundamental aspect is how much investors would be willing to
rely on automated recommendations.2 Trust is key for financial advice, and
mistrust in algorithms seems particularly severe in the context of financial
services.3
As shown in other domains, one way to build trust is to let humans and
robots interact, with the robot proposing an advice and the human being
the ultimate decision maker.4 In the context of robo-advising, human-robot
interactions are important when investors decide on whether to accept the
robo-service and define their portfolio allocations. They are also important
over time, when investors may be prompted to pay attention to their port-
folios even if not used to do so, or when they may be advised to rebalance
their portfolio in a given direction even if tempted to do otherwise. These
dynamic interactions are particularly interesting to see how reliance on the
robo-service evolves over time, say as investors experience market shocks or
as new investment opportunities arise. They are also useful to shed light on
whether investors perceive the robo-service as a complement or a substitute
to their own attention and reasoning.
We investigate these issues by exploiting the introduction of a robo-
advising service by a major French asset manager in a large set of Employee
Saving Plans. The key distinctive feature of this service is that it is truly a
robo-advisor which gives advice to the investors, both at the time of the sub-
1See e.g. Mullainathan, Noeth and Schoar (2012), Foà, Gambacorta, Guiso and Mis-
trulli (2019) on distorted incentives and Foerster, Linnainmaa, Melzer and Previtero
(2017), Linnainmaa, Melzer and Previtero (2020) on misguided beliefs; and Beshears,
Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2018), Gomes, Haliassos and Ramadorai (2021) for reviews.
2See Bianchi and Brière (2021) for evidence that robots have lower operating costs and
Philippon (2019b) for a discussion on how they may limit the extent of biased advice.
3As argued e.g. in Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2015) and Rossi and Utkus (2019a),
investors may value a trusting relationship with their advisor even beyond financial per-
formance.
4In a forecasting task, Dietvorst, Simmons and Massey (2018) show that participants
are more willing to rely on an automated advice when they can even slightly modify
the algorithm. Similarly, Burton, Stein and Jensen (2020) present several experimental
settings in which algorithm aversion is reduced when giving participants some control over
the underlying algorithm. Bianchi and Brière (2021) review some evidence on finance
applications.
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scription and over time, while leaving investors free to follow or to ignore the
advice. This makes it different from the more common robo-advisors that
automate portfolio investment and rebalancing, and this makes it particu-
larly useful for our purposes of focusing on human-robot interactions both
at the time of the subscription and over time.
Other interesting features come from the investment under study. First,
our data cover a representative sample of the French population employed
in the private sector. A large proportion of our investors have small port-
folios and little experience in the stock market, which makes this sample
particularly useful to explore whether robo-advisors can promote financial
inclusion. Investors with lower financial capabilities may have in princi-
ple the most to gain from robo-advising (D’Hondt, De Winne, Ghysels and
Raymond (2020)), but they may also be more reluctant to adopt the new
technology (Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2012), Collins (2012), Foster
and Rosenzweig (2010)), or they may end up misusing it (Campbell (2006)).
An open empirical question is whether robo-advising tempers or exacerbates
existing inequalities (Philippon (2019a), Abraham, Schmukler and Tessada
(2019)).
Second, in these investment plans, employees allocate part of their salaries
between a menu of funds proposed by the employer. While relative to stock
picking this should minimize issues of under-diversification, rebalancing be-
haviors may also induce significant differences in investors’ performance,
and this again may be particularly relevant for less sophisticated investors
(Bianchi (2018)).
Third, due to various lock-in rules, these investments have a long-term
perspective, which is relatively uncommon in the context of robo-advising
(Hammond, Mitchell and Utkus (2016)). Under-participation in retirement
plans is a widespread concern in many developed countries (Poterba (2014),
Benartzi and Thaler (2013)), and policy makers debate on whether robo-
advisors can impact participation to these plans and more generally to the
stock market (OECD (2017)).
The robo-advisor under study was introduced by the asset manager in
August 2017. The robo starts by eliciting information on the client’s char-
acteristics, builds the client’s profile, and proposes a portfolio allocation. If
the client accepts the proposal, the robo implements the allocation. Over
time, the robo sends email alerts if the current portfolio allocation ends up
being too far from the target allocation. These alert suggest to connect to
the platform and to rebalance the portfolio towards the target, while the
ultimate decision has to be taken directly by the investor.
The robo is proposed to employers and, if they accept, employees get
a notification on the availability of the service and decide whether or not
to subscribe it. Absent the robo, employees self-manage their portfolios
and have no access to a dedicated advice. We have access to account level
data covering from September 2016 to November 2018, aggregated at the
3
monthly level. Our sample contains all investors who have accepted the
robo-service as of November 2018, and for these investors we can observe
both contracts that are self-managed and contracts that are managed by the
robo. In addition, we have extracted random samples of individuals who
have not been offered the service (i.e., non-exposed), individuals who have
declined the offer without initiating the profiling process (i.e., non-takers),
and individuals who have initiated the profiling process without eventually
subscribing to the service (whom we call robo curious).
A key challenge for our empirical analysis is that the choice of taking up
the robo is voluntary and as such it could be driven by unobserved investors’
characteristics that are also related to our outcomes of interest. Our data
allow us to address this issue in several ways. First, we employ diff-in-diff
specifications in which we compare changes in our outcome of interest as-
sociated to the robo take-up to changes in a control group, which in our
baseline analysis we define as individuals who have not been exposed to the
robo-service. We then consider alternative control groups (i.e. non-takers or
curious) so as to isolate the effects of the robo from potentially confounding
factors. Second, we exploit the fact that the exposure to the robo depends
on an agreement between the employer and the asset manager, and as such
it is orthogonal to employee-specific shocks. We then compare exposed to
non-exposed individuals in an intention-to-treat specification. Third, we
build on our knowledge of the functioning of the robo and on the various
discontinuities in the algorithm to implement a regression discontinuity de-
sign. Fourth, since the decision to take-up the robo may be influenced by
interactions occurring at the workplace, we use the fraction of employees
adopting the robo in a given firm as a shifter for the individual propensity
to take-up. We provide more details of these alternative specifications, and
show the robustness of our findings, as we proceed with the analysis.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, the robo attracts
investors who are rather heterogeneous in terms of age, education, wealth;
overall, observable investor’s characteristics explain little of the take-up de-
cision. Moreover, these investors seem to trust the robo, they are even more
likely to accept the advice when this differs substantially from their current
allocation.5
Second, investors who take-up the robo increase their attention to the
portfolio, as measured by the amount of time spent on the dedicated com-
pany website, and their trading activities. These patterns hold even beyond
the time of the robo-subscription.
Third, investors increase the amount they invest in the saving plans, as
well as their risk exposure. This is explained not only by large increase in
5This finding can be contrasted with the observation that human advisers tend to
gain trust by being accommodating with clients’ beliefs and investment strategies (Mul-
lainathan et al. (2012)).
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equity share at the time of the subscription, but also by a positive trend
after the subscription.
Fourth, the robo-alerts, which by construction are sent after investors
experience large enough shocks to their portfolio, are effective in increasing
investors’ attention and rebalancing. As a result, investors remain closer to
their target equity exposure.
Fifth, investors with the robo experience a substantial increase in returns
(net of management fees), after controlling for various measures of portfolio
risk. Importantly, the main determinant of this increase comes from a change
in rebalancing behaviors.
Finally, we show that the increased equity exposure and returns associ-
ated to the robo-service are larger for investors with lower financial capabili-
ties, as measured by ex-ante portfolio size (a proxy for financial wealth) and
variable remuneration (a proxy for income), and with lower risk exposure
and returns at the baseline.
Overall, these findings are encouraging on the possibility to promote
human–robot interactions in the field of personal finance. We view our
results as contributing to the debate on how automation can impact financial
services, and more specifically to a growing literature on the effects of robo-
advising on portfolio choices (see D’Acunto and Rossi (2020) and Bianchi
and Brière (2021) for overviews).6 As stressed, a key distinctive feature in
our analysis is the focus on the dynamic interactions between the robo and
the investors. In our setting, these interactions are key to understand how
the robo impacts investors’ behaviors and performance.
Another important feature of our study is the focus on investors who
have little experience in the stock market and typically no access to finan-
cial advising. A similar perspective is taken by Reher and Sokolinski (2020),
who exploit the reduction of the account minimum by a major U.S. robo-
advisor, and show a significant increase in the share of ”middle class” par-
ticipants, who increase their risky share and their expected returns. While
the robo studied by Reher and Sokolinski (2020) directly manages investors’
portfolios, in our setting the robo provides recommendations and investors
decide whether or not to follow them. Under this perspective, the difference
is important as it shows that improving the participation of small investors
does not necessarily mean having them lose controls over their portfolios. In
fact, as we emphasize in the concluding remarks, we view investors’ active
participation as fundamental to promote learning and financial capability
6D’Acunto, Prabhala and Rossi (2019) show that a portfolio optimizer in an Indian
brokerage house has a beneficial impact on less diversified investors but not on diversified
investors. Rossi and Utkus (2019b) show that robo takers have larger risk-adjusted per-
formance and they invest in low-cost indexed mutual funds. Similar findings are reported
by Braeuer, Hackethal and Scheurle (2017) and Loos, Previtero, Scheurle and Hackethal
(2020) from a German bank; Reher and Sun (2016), instead, find little impacts on mutual
fund holders by a specialized robo-advisor U.S. provider.
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and as key when assessing the long-term consequences of the robo-service.
Relatedly, recent contributions show that long-run patterns of wealth
accumulation and inequality are strongly driven by the fact that wealthier
individuals earn persistently higher returns (Bach, Calvet and Sodini (2020),
Fagereng, Guiso, Malacrino and Pistaferri (2020)). Under this perspective,
our results suggest that automated advice can at least partly limit these
general patterns.
Our paper also relates to the literature on financial innovation and in-
vestors’ behaviors. Consistently with our findings, recent evidence suggests
that new investment products and services can induce investors to increase
their participation in the stock market (see e.g. Calvet, Celerier, Sodini and
Vallee (2020) and Hong, Lu and Pan (2020)). A key challenge is how new
products can be properly understood and used, especially by less sophisti-
cated investors (see e.g. Lerner and Tufano (2011) for a discussion based on
historical evidence, and Bianchi and Jehiel (2020) for a theoretical investi-
gation). Relative to this literature, our specific focus is on the human-robot
interaction, which allows investigating how investors’ trust can be built and
how changes in behaviors can be induced over time.
2 Data
The portfolio choices under study concern a large set of Employee Saving
Plans. Each year, as part of their compensation, employees receive a sum
of money to be allocated across a set of funds offered by the employer. The
employer can offer two types of contracts, which differ in the lock-in pe-
riod: 5-years (plan d’épargne entreprise) or until retirement (plan d’épargne
pour la retraite collectif ). Employees can make extra investment in the
plan, withdraw money after the lock-in period (or under exceptional cir-
cumstances), and freely rebalance their portfolios over time. An individual
can simultaneously hold several contracts from past and current employers.
These plans are managed by a large French asset manager. While tra-
ditionally employees received no advice on these portfolio choices, the asset
manager has introduced a robo-advisor service in August 2017. The robo
starts by eliciting information on the client’s characteristics, and specifically
on her risk-aversion (both through quantitative and qualitative questions),
financial knowledge and experience (both objective and self-assessed), age
and investment horizon. Based on these questions, the robo builds the
client’s profile (say, prudent, dynamic,..) and proposes a portfolio alloca-
tion. The client can visually compare the proposed allocation with her
current one both in terms of macro categories (proportion of equity, bonds,
money market funds, ...) and of specific funds. If the client accepts the pro-
posal, the robo implements the allocation. If the client rejects, the service is
terminated. Over time, the robo also sends email alerts if current portfolio
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allocation ends up being too far from the target allocation.
If the employer subscribes to the robo-service, its employees are informed
via email and they have the option to accept it on one or more of their sav-
ing accounts. The cost of the service is borne by the employee, and it has
an employer-specific component and an employee-specific component, which
depends on the value of her account. As of November 2018, around 8,000
companies have access to the offer, that corresponds to 646,884 employees
(out of over 1,9 millions employees active in those plans). Out of them,
189,918 individuals have expressed interest in the robo and started the pro-
cedure to receive the service by formally signing a “counselling agreement”
in at least one of their account. Out of them, 175,342 individuals ended up
not subscribing to the service and we refer to them as robo-curious while
the remaining 14,576 individuals have subscribed to the robo and we refer
to them as robo-takers. This correspond to 17,069 accounts managed by the
robo in 762 different firms. We observe no individual who subscribes to the
robo and then terminates the service within our sample period.
In our baseline analysis, our sample includes all the robo-takers and a
random sample of 20,000 individuals who are ”not-exposed” (i.e. employ-
ees of companies which do not have access to the service). We restrict to
individuals who have completed at least one transaction in one of their ac-
count in our sample period. This gives us a sample of 34,517 individuals and
92,578 contracts. Our data cover the period September 2016 to November
2018 and are aggregated at the monthly level. We have also extracted a
random sample of 20,000 individuals who are exposed but non-takers and a
random sample of 20,000 individuals who are curious, which we consider in
additional analyses detailed below.
We take advantage of several sources of (anonymized) data. First, we
have obtained detailed information on the investment choices. We observe
the menu of funds offered by the employer, the allocation chosen by the em-
ployee, new investments, rebalancing, and withdrawals. In addition, build-
ing on the information on returns of the various funds, we have constructed
the returns and various measures of risk of these portfolios (as detailed be-
low). Third, we have extracted information about investors’ activities on
the platform, both in terms of trading and in terms of digital footprints
(number of connections, duration, pages visited).
Fourth, for individuals who take the robo, we can observe the score they
are given by the robo, the associated profile and suggested allocation, and
the alerts the robo may be sending over time to propose new allocations. We
provide more details about those variables as we proceed with our analysis
below.
Our sample is representative of the French population of private sector
employees. The firms under study are representative of the French popu-
lation of private firms, and all employees in these firms have access to the
saving plans. As mentioned, this allows us to include in our analysis small in-
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vestors, who tend to be underrepresented in studies focusing on stock market
participants (say, from a brokerage house). The average value of the assets
invested in the plan is 7,654 euros, the median is 819 euros. These figures
are comparable to those one can find in representative surveys.7 Summary
statistics of the variables used in the analysis are reported in Table 1.
3 Results
We structure our analysis as follows. First, we consider which individual
characteristics tend to be associated to the propensity to take the robo,
within the sample of employees who have been exposed to the robo. Then,
we turn to the effects of robo taking on i) the attention investors pay to
their portfolio, ii) their trading activities and portfolio allocations, and iii)
their returns and risk.
3.1 Take-Up
We start by investigating who is more likely to take the robo. We focus on




iγ + µf + εi, (1)
where Ti is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i working in firm f has taken
the robo in period t, Xi is a vector of baseline individual and portfolio
characteristics, µf are firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. For each characteristic Xi we consider the average value
observed before August 2017, the date of the first robo introduction. Results
are reported in Table 2.8
In column 1, we observe that the probability of subscribing to the robo is
negatively related to being female and to the past returns, and it is positively
related to the amount of variable remuneration, though these effects are
small in magnitude.9 In column 2, we consider the extensive margin. We
restrict to robo takers and use as dependent variable the percentage of assets
7For example, data on household savings report average financial wealth around 60,000
euros and, for those who have access to employee savings’ plans, these plans represent on
average around 20% of their financial wealth. Sources: Observatoire de l’Epargne Eu-
ropéenne (http://www.oee.fr/files/faits saillants - 2020 t2.pdf) and Autorité des marchés
financiers (https://www.amf-france.org/fr/actualites-publications/publications/rapports-
etudes-et-analyses/les-actifs-salaries-et-lepargne-salariale).
8Probit regressions give similar results, we prefer to report linear regressions given the
large number of fixed effects in equation 1.
9We make sure that the proportion of treated individuals correspond to the true popu-
lation average. In this regression, we include a random sample of 638 takers, 7674 curious
and 20,000 exposed not curious so that the proportion of takers is 2.25% and the propor-
tion of curious is 27.11%, which correspond to the true population averages within the
group of exposed individuals. The same logic applies to the other regressions in this table.
8
managed by the robo, relative to the total assets in the investor’s portfolio.
We observe that investors with smaller portfolios, smaller equity exposure
and smaller past returns tend to delegate a larger fraction of their portfolio
to the robo. The same holds for male investors.
A key question is whether the robo can induce significant changes in
investors’ portfolios and whether recommending large changes impacts the
probability that the investor takes up the service. The distance between
the investor’s current allocation relative to the optimal one (as evaluated
by the robo) can be seen as a key component of the value added of the
robo. In addition, it has often been argued that human advisors tend to
be accommodating when clients express a preferred investment strategy and
have no incentive to recommend allocations which are too different from
investors’ prior, even when this is detrimental to investors’ performance
(Mullainathan et al. (2012)). It is thus interesting to check whether robo-
advisors are better able to induce allocations which are very different from
investors’ current allocations.
In order to investigate this question, we can exploit the fact that some
investors are robo curious: they complete the preliminary survey needed
to access the service and observe the robo recommendation but eventually
decide not to take-up the robo. For robo curious and robo takers, we can
define a measure of distance as the absolute value of the difference in the
equity share between the allocation proposed by the robo and the allocation
already implemented by the individual.10
In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if
the investor is a robo taker, and to zero if the investor is a robo curious.
We observe that the probability to take-up the robo, conditional on having
observed the recommendation, is higher for investors who are older, male,
have smaller portfolios and check more frequently their account. In column
3, we observe that the further away is the recommendation of the robo rela-
tive to the current allocation, the larger is the probability that the investor
subscribes to the robo.
Put differently, investors do not seem interested in paying for a service
which would induce only a minimal change in their current allocation. In
column 4, we instead look at the effect of the difference (not in absolute
value) between equity share proposed by the robo and the current equity
share, and observe that the riskier is the proposed allocation relative to the
current one, the more likely is that the investor takes up the robo. In terms
of magnitude, one standard deviation increase in the difference in equity
shares (equal to 0.27) is associated to a 4.3% increase in the probability to
take-up the robo (the average take-up in these specifications is 7%).
Overall, these results point towards an important ability of the robo to
10If an individual observes several robo recommendations in a given month without
subscribing the robo, we consider the latest recommendation in the month.
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reach under-served investors and to change in a substantial way their in-
vestment choices. First, while the probability to take-up the robo is hardly
affected by observable characteristics (apart from being female), the robo-
service appears relatively more important for investors with smaller port-
folio, who may be less likely to have access to external professional advice.
Second, and in contrast to typical human advisers, the robo is able to im-
plement allocations which are quite far from investors’ current allocations.
In particular, investors seem attracted by allocations which are riskier than
their current position, an issue we will explore in more details below.
3.2 Attention
We explore the behavioral changes associated to the robo in the following
fixed-effects OLS specification:
yi,t = αi + βTi,t +X
′
i,tγ + µt + εi,t, (2)
where αi and µt are individual and time fixed effects, Ti,t is a dummy equal
to 1 if individual i has taken the robo in period t, and Xi,t is a vector of
individual and portfolio characteristics. Standard errors are clustered by
individual.11 Unless specified otherwise, our controls include the average
equity share and the average returns over the past 12 months, the account
value in the previous month, the value of the yearly variable remuneration,
a dummy if the variable remuneration was received in the current month
and a dummy if the variable remuneration was received in the past month.
Our coefficient of interest β measures how, for a given individual i, the
outcome yi,t varies with the adoption of the robo, compared to the changes
experienced in the control group. In most of this analysis, our control group
is defined by a sample of individuals who have not been exposed to the robo,
while we consider alternative specifications in the robustness section.
We first consider the level of attention that investors pay to their port-
folios. As mentioned, we have extracted the login activities made on the
platform dedicated to the employee saving plan, and we observe the number
of connections, the number of web pages visited, the number of minutes
spent on the platform. We report our results in Table 3. Our key observa-
tion is that, after having taken the robo, investors spend more time on the
platform. In column 1, we observe an increase in the number of minutes
spent on the platform by 4.6 per month (the average is 6.2); in column 2,
we observe an increase in the number of web pages visited per month by 5.8
(the average is 6.5); in column 3, we observe an increase of 0.3 connections
per month (the average is 0.8).
In order to check the parallel trend assumption and uncover possible
11As we show in the Online Appendix, our results are basically unchanged if we employ
double clustering by individual and by time.
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dynamics of those effects, we consider the following regression





i,tγ + µt + εi,t, (3)
where µt−s and µt+s correspond to months before and after the treatment
and the other variables are as in (2). In Figure 1, we consider the number
of connections per month and report the estimated coefficients β−5, ..., β6
and the associated 95% confidence intervals. We observe no significant pre-
treatment differences. We also observe that the effect is largest right after
having taken the robo and tends to vanish, at least temporarily, after about
three months. The other measures of attention display similar dynamics.
One may question whether the increased attention is associated to the
robo subscription or to other events occurring at the same time. A typical
event that increases investors’ attention is the reception of the remuneration
that needs to be allocated across the various funds in the saving plan. Em-
ployees typically receive a communication before the reception and they are
asked to choose their allocation in the next month. Indeed, we observe an
increase in activities on the platform during the month of reception of the
remuneration, and if that corresponds to the month of robo subscription we
may confound the two effects. In column 4, we exclude the month before and
the month at which the individual has received the variable remuneration.
We see that our estimates are only slightly smaller than those in column 3.
A related concern is whether the effects persist also beyond the window
of the subscription to the service. In column 5, we exclude the two months
around the robo subscription and the month of reception of the remunera-
tion, which are generally periods in which investors pay more attention to
their portfolio. As intuitive, the estimated effects are smaller in magnitude
than the overall effects in column 3, but still significantly different from zero.
That is, robo takers display larger levels of attention also beyond even be-
yond the time of the subscription and the time of reception of the variable
remuneration.
In order to check this further, we consider whether robo takers have a
different level of attention around the time of the reception of the remuner-
ation, conditional on the fact that this occurs at least two months after the
subscription of the robo. We compare the number of connections for robo
treated and non robo treated (including individuals who never take the robo
and robo takers before subscription) between months t− 3 and t+ 3, where
t corresponds to the reception of the remuneration. The associated regres-
sions are in column 6 is for robo treated and column 7 is for non treated
(i.e. not exposed and takers before the subscription). We observe that robo
takers are more attentive throughout than non robo takers, and this is true
in particular in the month of reception of the remuneration (0.8 vs. 0.5
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connections). We will get back to investors’ increased attention in the next
analysis, when describing the effects of the alerts sent by the robo.
Overall, these result show that investors do not take the robo as a substi-
tute for their own attention. Rather, the robo is associated to an increased
level of attention, which persists even beyond the time of its subscription.
3.3 Activities and Investment
We now consider trading activities, which include investing extra money in
the plan, which can be done freely at any point in time with no cap on
the amount invested; withdraw money from the plan, which can be done
only after the expiration period or in exceptional circumstances (e.g. death,
invalidity, purchase of a house as primary residence, ...); or changing the
portfolio composition, i.e. the weights to the various funds offered by the
employer. None of these operations is directly subject to fees on the part
of the asset manager (robo fees are proportional to the amount held in the
plan).
In the next analysis, we consider regressions at the saving vehicle level:
yj,t = αj + βTj,t +X
′
j,tγ + µt + εj,t, (4)
where the treatment Tj,t equals 1 if investor i has taken up the robo in saving
vehicle j at time t (to simplify notation in what follows we use the subscript
j, t instead of i, j, t), αj are saving vehicle fixed effects, and the rest is as in
Equation (2). 12
We report our results in Table 4. We first consider pure rebalancing
activities, in which investors move money across funds without increasing or
decreasing their total investment. In column 1, we observe that subscribing
to the robo is associated to 0.21 more allocation changes by month, relative
to an average of 0.05. The total sum of rebalancing activities includes those
implemented by the robo at the time of subscription, those implemented by
the robo after the subscription date, and those directly implemented by the
investor. In column 2, we focus on portfolio rebalancing implemented by
the robo after subscription, and observe that a significant increase also in
these activities (explained in more details below). In column 3, we observe
no significant increase in rebalancing activities directly implemented by the
investor.
The robo is also associated to an increase in the number of personal
contributions of 0.005 per month (the average number is 0.03) and to a
non-significant decrease in the number of redemptions. The sum of the
12Alternatively, one can consider regressions at the individual level as in Equation (2)
and aggregate over the various contracts an individual may hold (in our sample, we observe
on average 2.68 contracts per investor). As we show in the Online Appendix, results at
the individual level are qualitatively the same as those at the contract level, indicating
very little spillovers across contracts held by the same individual.
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transactions described in columns 1, 4 and 5 represents the totality of the
transactions made in the account.
Interestingly, these patterns translate into an increase in the total amount
of money invested in the contract. Robo takers invest 84 euros more per
month in their contract, while on average monthly net inflows are much
smaller (1.7 euros).
3.4 Risk Taking
We now consider whether the robo adoption is associated to changes in the
composition of investors’ portfolio. As shown in Table 1, the main types of
funds are employer stock (29%), balanced funds (21%), bonds (18%), money
market (13%), equity funds (12%). In order have a measure of aggregate
risk exposure, we define the equity share as the value of equity, i.e. equity
funds and the equity parts of balanced funds, over the total value of the
portfolio.
Table 5 reports our evidence at the saving vehicle level as in Equation
(4). We observe that the robo subscription is associated to an increase in
the equity share by 8.7%. The effect is large, as compared with the average
equity share of 18%, and it is mainly driven by an increase in balanced funds
by 22.8% and by a decrease in bond funds by 15.5% and in money market
funds by 9.2%. We also notice that the robo induces a very minimal change
in investors’ exposure to the employer stock.
In order to better address whether the increased risk taking is driven by
the robo, as opposed to confounding factors occurring at the same time of
the subscription of the robo, we can exploit our knowledge of the algorithm
that maps investors’ characteristics to the recommended allocation. This
recommendation depends on a score that the robo constructs starting from
investors’ answers and that aggregates various dimensions, in particular in-
vestor’s attitudes towards risk and experience in financial products. The
resulting score takes values from 1 to 10 (with two decimals); in our sample
its average is equal to 3.37 and its standard deviation is equal to 2.54. When
an individual is assigned above a given cutoff, conditional on her investment
horizon, the robo proposes a larger exposure to risk. Cutoffs are defined at
2, 4, 6 and 8 and, as the score increases, the robo suggests diversified funds
with a larger proportion of equity. We are then interested in evaluating how
these discontinuities affect investors’ equity share.
Consider an individual i who takes up the robo on contract j at time
t, denote with Sj the score that the robo has assigned to individual i in
contract j, with c the closest discontinuity threshold and with Dj a dummy
equal to one if Sj ≥ c and to zero otherwise. We can consider a standard
regression discontinuity specification as




j,tDjδ2 + εj,t. (5)
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where yj,t is the equity share of individual i in contract j at time t. In
equation (5) we allow for different slopes and intercepts on both sides of
the cutoff, as captured by the coefficients γ1, γ2, we control for the investor’s
horizonHj,t (in polynomial form) and we allow the horizon to have a different
effect depending on the sign of the dummy Dj . Our coefficient of interest
is β, which estimates the effect on risk taking of being assigned just below
or above the threshold. We consider investors within a distance of 0.5 or of
0.25 from the threshold.
We start by providing descriptive evidence on how the score Sj assigned
by the robo impacts investors’ equity share, controlling for the investor’s
horizon Hj,t. In Figure 2, we plot the estimated β coefficient of the following
regression
yj,t = α+ βSj +H
′
j,tγ + εj,t, (6)
and the associated 95% confidence intervals. We see that investors’ equity
share increases with the score, with jumps around the thresholds. We inves-
tigate this more formally by estimating equation (5). In column 1 of Table
6, we report consider a bandwidth equal to 1. We show that being assigned
just above the threshold induces a 5% increase in the equity share, relative
to very similar investors assigned just below the threshold. In column 2,
we consider as dependent variable the average equity share between time
t and time t + 1, which may provide a more accurate estimate since if the
subscription is at time t, the corresponding allocation sometimes is realized
with some delay, at time t+ 1; in column 3, we consider a bandwidth equal
to 0.5.13 We observe in columns 2-3 that our result is basically unchanged.
We then perform two placebo tests. In column 4, we consider the average
equity share between time t and time t + 1 in contracts that individual i
holds but on which she has not subscribed to the robo. In column 5, we
consider as dependent variable the equity share at t − 1, just before the
robo subscription. In both columns, we observe no significant increase in
the equity share for individuals just above the thresholds, which supports
our interpretation that the effect in columns 1-3 are driven by the robo.
The above analysis shows that being assigned just above a discontinuity
threshold induces an increase of 5% in the equity share, relative to an average
of 15.7%. It is interesting to compare this figure with the 8.6% increase in
the equity share shown in Table 5. These estimates indicate that the effect of
taking up the robo is larger than simply that of being assigned above a given
threshold, other features of the robo are also important to induce investors
to take-up more risk. This can be seen also in Figure 3, which plots the
coefficients of a regression as in (3) with equity share as dependent variable,
showing a large increase in risk exposure at the time of the subscription, but
also a positive trend after the subscription.
13The MSE-optimal bandwidth, computed following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik
(2014), is equal to 0.815. Using this bandwidth, we obtain very similar results.
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3.5 Rebalancing
An important feature of the robo-service is that it sends alerts to investors
in case their current allocation is far from the target allocation, as defined at
the time of the robo subscription (or of the latest robo profiling). In case of
alert, the investor receives an email stating that there is discrepancy between
the current and the target allocation, due to the investor’s own trading or
to a market shock, and she is suggested to connect to the dedicated website
to consult her portfolio. The email alert is sent in the month at which
the deviation occurs; if the deviation persists an additional email is sent
the month after and then alerts stop, even if the deviation persists. If
after having connected, the investor decides to make the adjustment, this is
automatically implemented by the robo.
We are interested in investigating how investors respond to those alerts
for two reasons. First, we check whether the alerts are effective in inducing
investors to rebalance their portfolio so as to stay closer to their target
allocation. It has been shown that less sophisticated investors tend to chase
trends and as a result their risk exposure displays larger sensitivity to market
fluctuations (Bianchi (2018)). Second, investors’ reaction to alerts provides
(indirect) evidence on whether they trust the robo recommendation not only
at the time of the subscription but also after having experienced the service,
and in particular after relatively large shocks to their portfolios.
We organize our analysis in two steps. First, we consider the sample of
robo takers and robo curious (i.e., those individuals who have completed the
robo survey but have not subscribed to the service). For these investors, we
can build the distance between the current allocation and the target allo-
cation. For robo takers, we define the target allocation as the one proposed
by the robo and accepted by the investor. For robo curious, we define the
target allocation as the one held at the time of completion of the robo sur-
vey, which the investor has preferred to the one proposed by the robo. The
robo is programmed to send email alerts to investors if the distance between
the current and the target allocation exceeds a threshold x.14 Accordingly,
we construct a dummy Alert that is equal to one if the distance is above x,
and to zero otherwise. On average, in our sample, investors receive an alert
in 7.7% of the months after the subscription. The variable Alert can be
constructed also for robo curious, and it identifies the alerts that the robo
would have sent had they taken the robo. We can then measure, for robo
takers and robo curious, how the distance between current and target eq-
uity exposure varies with the robo treatment and the reception of the alert,
in a standard diff-in-diff specification as in Equation (4) in which the robo
treatment is interacted with the dummy Alert.
14The threshold is defined in terms of a Synthetic Risk and Reward Indicator (SRRI), a
measure of portfolio risk designed by the European Security and Market Authority. The
exact value of the threshold is confidential.
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We start by checking whether the reception of the alert is associated to
an increased attention to the portfolio. In column 1 of Table 7, we observe
that indeed upon reception of the alert investors are more likely to connect
to the platform; the number of connections increases by 0.23 connections per
month, relative to an increase of 0.11 connections associated to the coun-
terfactual alert.15 In columns 2-6, we consider the associated rebalancing
behaviors. In column 2, we consider the probability of rebalancing upon
reception of the alert (for robo-takers) or of the counterfactual alert (for
robo-curious). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the in-
vestor rebalances the portfolio in month t or t+1, where t is the first month
at which the distance between the actual and the target allocation exceeds
the alert threshold. We observe that robo-takers, who actually receive the
alert, are 19% more likely to rebalance their portfolio, as compared to a
baseline probability of rebalancing of 11.4% for robo curious. In column 3,
we observe that robo takers also decrease their distance by 7.2% more than
robo curious. The effect is large: conditionally on being alerted, the average
distance is 11.6% and the average change in the distance is −2.3%.
In columns 4 and 5, we restrict to robo takers and we compare the
effect of our alert with another alert which investors receive if they have
not completed the profiling survey as requested by the regulator (MIF).
We observe that the effect of the MIF alert is small and not significant,
confirming that the robo makes investors’ portfolio closer to their target
thanks to its specific alert.
Our second step of analysis focuses on robo takers and exploits the dis-
continuity in the alert around the x threshold in a standard RDD. We restrict
to clients within a distance of 0.1 from the threshold (for comparison, the
standard deviation of the distance is 0.75).16 In column 6, we observe that
ending up just above the threshold, and thereby receiving the robo alert,
induces a 1.27% decreases the distance between the current and the tar-
get portfolio allocation in terms of equity share. This confirms the previous
findings and shows that the robo alert is indeed effective in making investors
rebalance their portfolio so as to bring them closer to their target allocation.
3.6 Returns
We consider whether the changes in trading patterns described above are
associated to changes in portfolio returns, controlling for various measures
of risk. We start with the same specification as in (4), using realized returns
as dependent variable. Throughout this analysis, we use returns net of
management fees, which we estimate directly from the liquidation value of
15Counterfactual alerts, just like actual alerts, occur after large changes in portfolio
weights due to market shocks or active rebalancing, hence it is intuitive that even those
alerts are associated to an increased attention.
16Using the MSE-optimal bandwidth (equal to 0.118) gives very similar results.
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the various funds. Results are presented in Table 8.
In column 1, we show that the robo treatment is associated to an increase
in returns by 5.4% per year. This effect is large, compared to an average
return of 6.2%. At the same time, we know from the previous analysis that
the robo induces investors to take more risk, so we ask how much of the
increase in returns is explained by increased risk. In column 2, we control
for the equity share in the previous period; in column 3, we control for
volatility, computed over a rolling window of 12 months; in column 4, we
control for the beta of the portfolio, computed by taking as benchmark the
returns of all the portfolios in our sample. We observe in these specifications
that the robo treatment is associated to an increase between 3 and 5% in
yearly returns, which is slightly smaller than the baseline estimate but still
very large. Finally, in column 5, we consider the portfolio’s alpha, computed
from the CAPM using again as benchmark the returns of all the portfolios in
our sample. We observe that the robo treatment is associated to an increase
also in the portfolio’s alpha of about 2% (the average alpha in our sample
is −2%).17
To have a rough measure of the euro value of these extra returns, con-
sider an investor with average investment in the plan (36, 000 euros) and
average horizon (17 years). An increase in yearly returns by 5.4% would be
associated to an increase in final wealth by about 23, 500 euros. These extra
returns can be compared to the fees associated to the subscription of the
robo. On average, in our sample, investors pay a management fee equal to
0.01% of the amount invested in the saving plan. For robo takers, the fee is
on average equal to 0.05% of the portfolio. These estimates are crude and
should be interpreted with care, also given that we are considering realized
returns over a relatively short period of time. Still, they suggest that the
robo can have a significant impact on investors’ wealth accumulation in the
long run.
3.6.1 Static vs. Dynamic Effects
We investigate the determinants of the increase in returns associated to
the robo by distinguishing a static effect occurring at the time of the sub-
scription of the robo from a dynamic effect associated to different portfolio
dynamics after the subscription. As shown above, after subscribing to the
robo, investors’ portfolios change in two dimensions. First, at the time of the
subscription, they move from their current allocation to the one proposed
by the robo. We call this a static effect, which can positively impact returns
to the extent that investors hold sub-optimal portfolio allocations, since for
example they hold biased views about the expected returns and risk, or
17As robustness check, we also consider returns by omitting the employer’s stock from
our computations. Results are reported in the Online Appendix, the estimated effects are
slightly smaller, but overall consistent with the ones in Table 9.
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because they choose allocations at the interior of the efficient frontier. Sec-
ond, investors change the way in which they rebalance their portfolio over
time, which we call a dynamic effect. The resulting impact on returns can
be positive if for example investors change their risk exposure over time by
wrongly timing the market. We investigate how the two effects contribute
to the observed changes in portfolio returns.
Consider an investor who takes up the robo at time t∗ and let us define
ω1(s, t) as the observed portfolio weight on asset s at the beginning of time
t ≥ t∗ and ω0(s, t) as the counterfactual weight on asset s the investor
would have had without the robo. The associated portfolio returns at time
t are R1(t) =
∑
s ω1(s, t)R(s, t), where R(s, t) are the returns of asset s
at time t, and the counterfactual returns without the robo are R0(t) =∑
s ω0(s, t)R(s, t). According to the above estimates, the total effect R1(t)−
R0(t) is around 5.4% in yearly returns, and we wish to decompose this
effect into a static and a dynamic effect. One way would be to estimate the
counterfactual returns the investor would have experienced had she changed
her allocation as proposed by the robo at time t∗ without changing her
rebalancing behaviors at time t > t∗. While these returns are not observable,
and rebalancing behaviors may vary considerably across clients, our effects
can be estimated as follows.
Let us define the counterfactual weights ω
′
0(s, t) = ω0(s, t) + (ω1(s, t
∗)−
ω0(s, t
∗)), constructed such that ω
′
0(s, t
∗) = ω1(s, t
∗) and ω
′
0(s, t) is parallel
to ω0(s, t) at t ≥ t∗. These weights isolate the portfolio change induced at
the time of the robo subscription, ω1(s, t
∗) − ω0(s, t∗), while keeping the
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∗)−ω0(s, t∗). It follows that the
static effect can be computed as




∗)R(s, t) is the counterfactual return the investor
would have experienced had she kept her portfolio weights constant at the




the counterfactual return the investor would have experienced had she kept
her portfolio weights constant at the level observed just before t∗. Both
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counterfactual returns can be computed with our data. Accordingly, the
dynamic effect can be computed as
D(t) = R1(t) −R0(t) − (C1(t) − C0(t)). (8)
In column 1 of Table 9, we report our estimates of the static effect according
to Equation (7) by considering the same diff-in-diff specification as in Equa-
tion (4) with C1(t)−C0(t) as dependent variable. For robo takers, we use the
portfolio weights observed at the time of the robo subscription; for investors
who do not take the robo, we use the portfolio weights observed at the time
of the first reception of the variable remuneration. We observe that the
static effect accounts for 2% of the total increase in returns, the remaining
3.4% is driven by the dynamic effect (the total effect, estimated in column
1 of Table 8, is 5.4%). In columns 2-3, we repeat the same decomposition
controlling for various measures of risk, and find similar estimates.
An alternative way to estimate our effects can be implemented with-
out introducing counterfactual returns R
′
0(t) but rather by exploiting our
knowledge of the robo algorithm. We know that, in our sample period, the
robo’s recommendations are essentially intended to induce constant port-
folio weights.18 Notice that these are intended allocations since the robo
does not directly control investors’ rebalancing. Hence, if the robo keeps
the investor’s current allocation ω0(s, t
∗) unchanged and just changes her
rebalancing behavior according to constant weights, the investor would ex-
perience returns C0(t). The intended dynamic effect can be computed as
D̂(t) = C0(t) −R0(t), (9)
and the corresponding static effect can be computed as the residual
Ŝ(t) = R1(t) −R0(t) − (C0(t) −R0(t)). (10)
In column 4 of Table 9, we report our estimates of the static effect according
to Equation (10). In this specification, the static effect accounts for about
2.3% of the total increase in returns, the remaining 3.1% is driven by the dy-
namic effect. In columns 5-6, we repeat the same decompositions controlling
for various measures of risk, and again find similar estimates.
Overall, these figures show that a key determinant of the increase in re-
turns we observe is given by a dynamic effect associated to the way in which
investors rebalance their portfolios over time. According to our estimates,
a change in rebalancing behaviors is associated to increase of about 200bps
per year. As mentioned above, these estimates may depend on our rela-
tively short sample period, and it may be useful to put them in perspective
18This would not be true over a longer time period, on which the robo would change
the suggested allocations according to the investor’s life-cycle.
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with other estimates of rebalancing premia. Comparing portfolio rebalanc-
ing with constant weights to a buy-and-hold strategy, Maeso and Martellini
(2020) find an annualized rebalancing premium of 100bp in the US stock
market, controlling for several risk factors. Similarly, for a diversified port-
folio composed only of stocks and bonds, Ang, Brandt and Denison (2014)
estimate a rebalancing premium of 0.14 in terms of average returns over
realized volatility. As average volatility in our setting is around 10%, this
would correspond to a premium of 140bp. While smaller than our estimates,
they confirm the general message that changing rebalancing behaviors can
be a key determinant of portfolio performance.
4 Financial Inclusion
An important open question is whether robo-services can promote financial
inclusion thanks to the ability to serve customers with smaller portfolios. We
explore this question by considering whether our main effects of increased
risk taking and increased risk-adjusted returns are heterogeneous depending
on ex-ante investors’ characteristics. We focus on two measures of investors’
capability. First, we look at the value of his portfolio, which we take as
a proxy for investors’ financial wealth. Second, we look at the value of
the variable remuneration, which is proportional to the investor’s wage and
hence can be taken as a proxy for investors’ income. In addition, we consider
investors’ equity share and returns. For each of these characteristics, we
classify investors into quartiles based on the average values observed before
August 2017, the date of the first robo introduction.19
We report our results in Table 10. In column 1-3, the dependent vari-
able is the equity share. In column 1, we observe that the increase in equity
exposure associated to the robo is larger for investors with smaller port-
folio and in fact it is decreasing monotonically with size. Investors in the
first quartile, i.e. those with smaller portfolios, increase equity share by
13.3%, those in the last quartile increase their equity share by 2.7%. All
our estimates across quartiles are statistically different from each other. A
similar pattern emerges when we consider quartiles based on the value of the
variable remuneration. In column 3, we observe that the increase in equity
share is exposure for investors with lower equity share at the baseline, and
again the effect of the robo is decreasing monotonically with baseline equity
exposure.
In columns 4-6, we look at the effect on returns while controlling for
volatility. In columns 4 and 5, we observe that the increase in returns
19The quartiles in terms of portfolio size are respectively equal to 2176, 10393, and
37010 euros. In terms of variable remuneration, they are equal to 0, 591, and 2369 euros.
In terms of monthly returns, they are equal to −0.01%, 0.31%, and 1.39%. In terms of
equity share, they are equal to 0, 5.44%, and 22.75%.
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associated to the robo is larger for investors with smaller portfolio and lower
variable remuneration. In column 6, we observe larger increase in returns
for investors with lower returns at the baseline.
While the robo-recommendations are also based on investors’ horizon,
these patterns are distinct from the impacts of the robo depending on in-
vestor’s age. Adding the interaction between the robo treatment and in-
vestor’s age, the effects are slightly stronger for middle-aged investors, while
the above results remain unchanged. Notice also that these effects do not
imply that the robo is recommending larger equity exposure, say, to smaller
investors. Looking at the correlation between individual characteristics and
the risk score assigned by the robo, we observe that the robo tends to recom-
mend larger equity exposure to investors who are younger, male, richer (in
terms of portfolio value and variable remuneration) and with larger equity
exposure at the baseline.
Overall, these results suggest that the robo is able to induce larger port-
folio changes on smaller investors, in terms of income and of wealth; that
is, precisely on those who are less likely to receive traditional advice and to
participate to the stock market. Moreover, the robo tend to reduce cross-
investors differences in returns and risk exposure, as its effects are larger
on those with lower returns and lower risk exposure at the baseline. These
results are limited in the sense they they concern a subset of the investor’s
overall financial wealth. Yet, they confirm the view that the robo-service can
be an important instrument towards financial inclusion (Reher and Sokolin-
ski (2020), D’Hondt et al. (2020)).
5 Self-Selection
The decision to take-up the robo-service is voluntary and it can be driven
by possibly unobservable characteristics that may also affect our outcome
variables. In our previous analysis, we have addressed this issue by exploit-
ing discontinuities in the robo algorithm or by controlling for time-invariant
individual-specific characteristics in a standard diff-in-diff specification. In
the latter case, a possible concern is that individual-specific shocks may
simultaneously drive the robo subscription and a change in trading behav-
iors. In this section, we report a series of tests which aim at addressing this
concern.
To simplify the exposition, all tables in this section have the same struc-
ture, which replicates our main results based on diff-in-diff specifications. In
column 1, we consider the effect on attention (as in column 3 of Table 3);
in column 2, we consider trading activities (as in column 1 of Table 4); in
column 3, we consider net inflows (as in column 6 of Table 4); in column 4,
we consider equity exposure (as in column 1 of Table 5); in column 5, we
consider returns (as in column 1 of Table 8); in column 6, we consider the
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static change in returns (as in column 1 of Table 9).20
5.1 Varying the Control Group
Our first test investigates the robustness of our findings when we vary the
control group. While the above analysis compares robo takers to observa-
tionally similar individuals who have not been offered the service, we now
compare them to individuals who have been offered the service and did not
express interest in the robo or to robo curious. In the first case, we condition
on the exposure to the robo, and isolate the effect of taking up the service as
opposed to not expressing interest. In the second case, we condition on the
fact that the individual has expressed some interest in the robo, and com-
pare the effect of the take-up relative to observing the robo’s profiling and
recommendation without subscribing to the service. We report our results
in Table 11, in which the control group are those exposed to the robo, and
in Table 12, in which the control group are the robo curious. In both tables,
results are remarkably similar to our baseline estimates. This is important
since it shows that the exact specification of the control group is not a key
driver of our results, our estimates are mainly driven by changes in behaviors
within the group of robo-takers (as opposed to between groups). Moreover,
while robo curious could in principle replicate the robo’s recommendation
without subscribing, these results suggest that our estimated effect are as-
sociated to the adoption of the robo-service, not just to the observation of
the robo recommendation.
5.2 Intention to Treat
As a second test, we estimate the effects of being offered the robo-service
(as opposed to subscribing to the service) relative to not being exposed to
the service. The fact of being offered the robo depends on the choice of
the asset manger and the employer, not of the employee, and as such it is
likely orthogonal to employee-specific shocks. In Table 13, we observe that
our results are qualitatively unchanged. This is remarkable since these es-
timates are associated to the mere effect of having been offered access to
the robo-service, as opposed to the potentially endogenous take-up decision.
As expected, magnitudes are significantly smaller than in our baseline esti-
mates. This is consistent with the fact that robo takers are a small fraction
of those who are exposed. In these regressions, the proportion of takers in
the sample is 1.32% while in the baseline regressions takers were about 42%
of the sample.21 Importantly, these results suggest that those who do not
take the robo display similar behaviors as those who have not been exposed.
20We follow the same structure also for the tables in the Online Appendix in which we
present additional robustness checks.
21As in Table 2, we make sure that the proportion of treated individuals correspond to
the true proportion in the sample of exposed individuals. In this regression, we include a
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5.3 Instrumenting Take-up
As third robustness check, we look for shifters to the propensity to take-
up the service which are unlikely to be driven by individual-specific shocks.
Interactions on the workplace may be an important determinant of take-
up, which can be partly driven by peer effects, or by some word of mouth
learning about the service. In fact, we observe an important variation in
the take-up decisions across firms. In the 762 firms with at least one taker,
the average take-up is 2.5% and the standard deviation is 8.1% with take-up
ranging from 0.1% in the 5th percentile to 6.1% in the 95th percentile.
As intuitive, firms with low take-up may be different from firms with
high take-up. As we show in the Online Appendix, the fraction of treated
individuals is positively associated to employees’ average age, assets in the
plans, and variable remuneration. At the same time, the validity of the
instrument relies on the assumption that these differences across firms in
the overall take-up rate are uncorrelated to shocks which are specific to the
individual employee. Accordingly, we instrument the individual robo take-
up by the fraction of employees in the same firm that have adopted the
robo.
We report our results in Table 14. We observe that indeed the instru-
ment is a strong predictor of the propensity to take-up; the validity of the
instrument relies on the premise that these peer effects are orthogonal to
individual-specific shocks. The estimated effects are once again very much
in line with the baseline results. In fact, the estimated impact on personal
contributions, equity exposure and realized returns are slightly larger than
the corresponding OLS.
6 Conclusion
We have found that having access to a robo-advisor induces investors to pay
more attention to their portfolios, to increase their investment and exposure
to equity, and it results in higher risk-adjusted returns. We have shown
that an important dimension of these effects is dynamic: the robo is able
to induce investors to rebalance their portfolio in a way that keeps them
closer to the target allocation. We have also found that these effects are
particularly strong for investors with smaller portfolio, who are less likely
to be served by traditional advice.
These results leave many questions open for future research. For example:
what are the mechanisms whereby the robo can induce investors to take
more risk and to change their rebalancing behaviors? Are the effects of
the robo similar in good and bad times, and more generally what are its
random sample of 638 takers, 7674 curious, 20,000 exposed not curious, and 20,000 not
exposed.
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long term consequences on investors? Our analysis highlights the role of
human-robot interactions (e.g. through the alerts) and more generally the
importance of having investors being the ultimate decision makers on their
portfolios as opposed to fully delegating to the robo. Potentially, this aspect
is key to promote investors’ learning on how to manage their portfolios and
to improve their financial capabilities.22 In this way, rather than reducing
investors’ attention and awareness, the robo-service can be seen as a tool to
promote financial education. We believe this aspect is fundamental when
assessing the long-run consequences of robo-advising. We view our analysis
as a first step in a promising direction, further work is certainly needed.
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7 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Investors’ Attention: Dynamics
Note: This figure displays how the changes in the number of connections to the platform
differ between robo takers and non-takers, before and after the robo subscription. T-5/T-
1 correspond to months before the treatment, T/T+5 correspond to months after the
treatment. The points correspond to the estimated beta coefficients of equation (3), the
bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2: Investor Score and Equity Share
Note: This figure plots investors’ equity share as a function of the risk score assigned by
the robo, controlling for investors’ horizon. The points correspond to the estimated beta
coefficients of equation (6), the bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
29
Figure 3: Equity Exposure: Dynamics
Note: This figure displays how the changes in equity exposure differ between robo takers
and non-takers, before and after the robo subscription. T-5/T-1 correspond to months
before the treatment, T/T+5 correspond to months after the treatment. The points
correspond to the estimated beta coefficients of equation (3), the bars correspond to 95%
confidence intervals.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable p5 mean p95 sd N
Panel A: Individual characteristics
Age 29.00 48.48 67.00 11.72 2,263,612
Female 0.00 0.31 1.00 0.46 2,255,803
Saving plan value 0.00 7,654 36,569 27,065 2,263,612
Total account value 48.73 36,140 148,381 74,763 2,263,612
Yearly variable remuneration 0.00 2,199 9,415 3,568 2,263,612
Nb of saving vehicles 1.00 4.43 11.00 3.44 2,263,612
Panel B: Attention
Number of connections per month 0.00 0.85 4.00 3.13 2,263,612
Number of web pages viewed per month 0.00 6.51 35.00 23.29 2,263,612
Number of min spent on website per month 0.00 6.17 34.42 28.28 2,263,612
Panel C: Asset allocation
Weight in diversified equity funds 0.00 0.12 0.80 0.26 1,547,647
Weight in balanced funds 0.00 0.21 1.00 0.34 1,547,647
Weight in employer stock funds 0.00 0.29 1.00 0.43 1,547,647
Weight in bond funds 0.00 0.18 1.00 0.32 1,547,647
Weight in money market funds 0.00 0.13 1.00 0.30 1,547,647
Equity share 0.00 0.18 0.84 0.28 1,547,647
Panel D: Transactions
Number of asset allocation changes 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.23 2,263,612
Number of asset allocation changes (robo) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.10 2,263,612
Number of asset allocation changes (free) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.13 2,263,612
Number of personal contributions 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.21 2,263,612
Number of redemptions 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.10 2,263,612
Net monthly inflow (Euros) 0.00 1.71 107.50 1,966 2,263,612
Panel E: Performances
Ann. return -0.11 0.06 0.33 0.24 1,409,556
Volatility 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.19 1,409,556
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of our variables.
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Table 2: Robo Take-Up
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Taker Share Taker
Age 6.56e-05 0.000194 0.00269*** 0.00272***
(0.000107) (0.000509) (0.000668) (0.000635)
Female -0.00444** -0.0204*** -0.0251* -0.0251*
(0.00209) (0.00561) (0.0142) (0.0147)
Account value (ln) 0.000860 -0.0325*** -0.0187*** -0.0197***
(0.00186) (0.00378) (0.00480) (0.00519)
Equity share 0.0116 -0.0912** -0.112*** 0.0230
(0.00812) (0.0434) (0.0279) (0.0457)
Variable remuneration 2.80e-06*** -3.47e-06 -6.37e-06** -8.06e-06**
(9.91e-07) (2.46e-06) (3.11e-06) (3.23e-06)
Returns -0.126* -2.132*** -0.196 -0.106
(0.0711) (0.420) (0.753) (0.680)
Connections 0.00184 -0.00126 -0.00465*** -0.00429***
(0.00112) (0.00176) (0.00155) (0.00140)
Robo equity distance 0.154***
(0.0494)
Robo equity change 0.160***
(0.0400)
Sample Takers Takers Takers+Curious
+ Exposed
Mean Dep. Var. 0.02 0.74 0.07 0.07
Observations 27,616 13,676 7,746 7,746
R-squared 0.003 0.046 0.014 0.018
Number of Clusters 1,966 713 591 591
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column 1, the
dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual has taken up the
robo and to zero if the individual has been exposed to the robo and has not
taken it. In column 2, the sample is restricted to robo takers and the dependent
variable is the fraction of the investor’s portfolio managed by the robo. In
columns 3-4, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual has
taken up the robo and to zero if the individual is robo curious (i.e., has observed
the recommendation of the robo and has not accepted it). All regressions include
firm fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Investors’ Attention
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Variable Minutes Pages Number of connections
Robo treated*after 4.594*** 5.781*** 0.296*** 0.223*** 0.112***
(0.146) (0.119) (0.0169) (0.0156) (0.0163)




Remun.t+1 to t+3 0.0311 0.0245**
(0.0264) (0.0103)
Sample All No rem No Rem Sub Treated Non-treated
Observations 782,421 782,421 782,421 637,074 627,286 71,288 682,839
R-squared 0.027 0.050 0.029 0.013 0.012 0.031 0.022
Number of Clusters 34,441 34,441 34,441 33,019 33,018 13,098 34,409
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column 1, the dependent variable is the number
of minutes spent on the dedicated website per month; in column 2; the dependent variable is the number
of webpages visited per month; in columns 3-7, the dependent variable is the number of connections per
month. In column 4, we exclude the month before and the month at which the individual has received the
variable remuneration. In column 5, the sample excludes the two months around the robo subscription and
the month of the reception of the remuneration. In columns 6-7, time t corresponds to the reception of the
remuneration, conditional on the fact that this occurs at least two months after the subscription of the robo.
In column 6, the sample is restricted to robo treated; in column 7, the sample is restricted to non- treated
investors. All regressions include individual and time fixed effects. Controls include the average equity share
and the average returns over the past 12 months, the account value in the previous month, the value of the
yearly variable remuneration. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Trading Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Changes Robo(>t) Individual Contributions Redemptions Net inflows
Robo treated*after 0.214*** 0.0402*** 0.000116 0.00550*** -0.000623 83.77***
(0.00141) (0.000682) (0.000990) (0.00113) (0.000523) (7.598)
Observations 1,567,958 1,567,958 1,567,958 1,567,958 1,567,958 1,567,958
R-squared 0.057 0.027 0.001 0.058 0.006 0.015
Number of Clusters 34,441 34,441 34,441 34,441 34,441 34,441
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column 1, the dependent variable is the number
of allocation changes per month; in columns 2-3, the dependent variable is the number of allocation changes
induced by the robo and directly chosen by the individual, respectively; in column 4, the dependent variable
is the number of personal contributions; in column 5, the dependent variable is the number of redemptions;
in column 6, the dependent variable is the net monthly inflow in euros. All regressions include individual
and time fixed effects. Controls include the average equity share and the average returns over the past 12
months, the account value in the previous month, the value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy
if the variable remuneration was received in the current month and a dummy if the variable remuneration
was received in the past month. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parenthesis. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 5: Risk Taking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Equity Sh. Equity Balanced Employer Bond Money
Robo treated*after 0.0866*** 0.0272*** 0.228*** 0.00234*** -0.155*** -0.0916***
(0.00220) (0.00183) (0.00318) (0.000721) (0.00292) (0.00250)
Observations 1,450,851 1,450,851 1,450,851 1,450,851 1,450,851 1,450,851
R-squared 0.069 0.010 0.199 0.005 0.118 0.058
N. of Clusters 34,398 34,398 34,398 34,398 34,398 34,398
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions at the saving account level. In column 1,
the dependent variable is the equity share; in column 2, it is the portfolio weight in diversified equity
funds; in column 3, it is the weight in balanced funds; in column 4, it is the weight in employer stock
funds; in column 5, it is the weight in bond funds; in column 6, it is the weight in money market
funds. All regressions include individual and time fixed effects. Controls include the average equity
share and the average returns over the past 12 months, the account value in the previous month, the
value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy if the variable remuneration was received in the
current month and a dummy if the variable remuneration was received in the past month. Standard
errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Risk Taking (RDD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable Equity Sh. Average Equity Sh. Past Equity Sh.
I(score>cutoff) 0.0514*** 0.0506*** 0.0593* 0.0353 0.00642
(0.0158) (0.0145) (0.0330) (0.0379) (0.0197)
Score - cutoff 0.0313 0.0340 -0.0355 0.0739 0.00303
(0.0417) (0.0383) (0.183) (0.0968) (0.0521)
Score - cutoff*I(score>cutoff) -0.128*** -0.136*** -0.159 0.00626 0.00428
(0.0451) (0.0414) (0.191) (0.104) (0.0564)
I(score>cutoff)*horizon 0.00546*** 0.00587*** 0.00554*** -0.00553*** -7.37e-05
(0.000889) (0.000817) (0.00137) (0.00204) (0.00111)
Horizon 0.0462*** 0.0466*** 0.0491*** 0.0139** 0.000547
(0.00248) (0.00228) (0.00281) (0.00590) (0.00310)
Horizon2 -0.00137*** -0.00138*** -0.00149*** 0.000337 0.000390
(0.000209) (0.000192) (0.000223) (0.000486) (0.000262)
Horizon3 4.78e-06 5.30e-06 6.53e-06 -1.90e-05* -1.20e-05*
(4.91e-06) (4.51e-06) (5.23e-06) (1.13e-05) (6.15e-06)
Sample Robo Non-Robo Robo
Observations 5,038 5,041 3,944 2,836 5,061
R-squared 0.488 0.540 0.535 0.079 0.398
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column 1, the dependent variable is the equity
share at t, the time of the robo subscription; in columns 2 and 3, the dependent variable is the average
equity share between time t and time t+1; in column 4, the dependent variable is average equity share
between time t and time t+1 in contracts held by individual i but not managed by the robo; in column
5, the dependent variable is the equity share at time t-1. In column 1,2,4 and 5 we estimate equation (5)
with a bandwidth equal to 1; in column 3 we use a bandwidth equal to 0.5. All regressions include time
fixed effects. Controls include the average equity share and the average returns over the past 12 months,
the account value in the previous month, the value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy if the
variable remuneration was received in the current month and a dummy if the variable remuneration was
received in the past month. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Alerts and Rebalancing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Connections Rebalancer Change in Distance Actual - Target Equity Distance
Robo treated*after*alert 0.121*** 0.190*** -0.0725***
(0.0338) (0.00689) (0.00241)
Robo treated*after 0.700*** 0.0155*** -0.00428*
(0.0502) (0.00180) (0.00242)
Alert 0.115** 0.114*** 0.0403*** -0.0261***









Sample Robo takers+curious Robo takers
Observations 173,392 190,242 190,242 83,758 71,888 4,326
R-squared 0.036 0.235 0.041 0.028 0.010 0.081
Number of Clusters 31,130 31,123 31,123 13,282 13,016
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column 1, the dependent variable is the number of
connections per month. In column 2, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the investor rebalances
the portfolio in month t or t+1, where t is the first month at which the distance between the actual and the
target allocation exceeds the alert threshold. In columns 3-5, the dependent variable is the change in the distance
between the actual and the target equity share between t+1 and t-1. In columns 1-3, the sample is restricted
to robo takers and robo curious. Alert is a dummy equal to one if the distance between the actual and the
target allocation is above the alert threshold, and to zero otherwise. In column 4-6, the sample is restricted to
robo takers. Alert MIF is a dummy equal to one if the investor receives an alert as they have not completed
the profiling survey requested by the regulator. In column 6, the dependent variable is the distance between the
actual and the target equity share, the sample is restricted to observations in which the distance based on SRRI
does not exceed 0.1, I(distance¿cutoff) is a dummy equal to one if the distance is above the alert threshold, and to
zero otherwise. All regressions include time fixed effects, and in columns 1-5 also individual fixed effects. Controls
include the account value in the previous month, the value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy if the
variable remuneration was received in the current month and a dummy if the variable remuneration was received
in the past month. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 8: Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable Annual return alpha
Robo treated*after 0.0539*** 0.0518*** 0.0306*** 0.0423*** 0.0197***







Observations 1,362,797 1,362,797 1,362,797 776,564 776,564
R-squared 0.104 0.104 0.479 0.190 0.028
Number of Clusters 34,241 34,241 34,241 32,485 32,485
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In columns 1-4, the de-
pendent variable is the annual returns at the saving vehicle level. In column 5, the
dependent variable is the portfolio alpha, computed from the CAPM using as bench-
mark the returns of the funds across all investors. All regressions include individual
and time fixed effects. Controls include the account value in the previous month,
the value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy if the variable remuneration
was received in the current month and a dummy if the variable remuneration was
received in the past month. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in
parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 9: Returns: Static vs. Dynamic Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Static Effect (1) Static Effect (2)
Robo treated*after 0.0200*** 0.0105*** 0.0217*** 0.0232*** 0.0101*** 0.0202***





Observations 1,362,797 1,362,797 776,564 1,362,797 1,362,797 776,564
R-squared 0.014 0.151 0.020 0.019 0.309 0.032
Number of Clusters 34,241 34,241 32,485 34,241 34,241 32,485
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions aimed at decomposing the total change in
returns associated to the robo-service between a static effect occurring at the time of the subscription
and a dynamic effect associated to different portfolio dynamics after the subscription. For robo-takers,
define t* as the date of robo-subscription and, for non-takers, as the date of first reception of the
variable remuneration. In columns 1-3, the dependent variable is the static effect on annual returns,
computed according to equation (7), which is the difference between the counterfactual returns the
investor would have experienced had she kept her portfolio weights constant at the level observed
at t* and those she would have experienced had she kept her weights constant at the level observed
at t*-1. In column 4-6, the dependent variable is the static effect on annual returns, computed
according to equation (10), which is the difference between the returns the investor has experienced
after t* and those she would have experienced had she kept her portfolio weights constant at the
level observed at t*-1. All regressions include individual and time fixed effects. Controls include the
account value in the previous month, the value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy if the
variable remuneration was received in the current month and a dummy if the variable remuneration
was received in the past month. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 10: Heterogenous Impacts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Equity Exposure Annual return
































Volatility 1.172*** 1.171*** 1.171***
(0.0248) (0.0249) (0.0249)
Observations 1,450,851 1,450,851 1,450,851 1,365,421 1,365,421 1,365,421
R-squared 0.082 0.080 0.144 0.479 0.479 0.481
Number of Clusters 34,398 34,398 34,398 34,241 34,241 34,241
Note: In columns 1-3, the dependent variable is the equity share; in columns 4-6, the dependents variable is
the annual return. The estimated coefficients refer to the interaction between the robo treatment and investor’s
quartile based on portfolio size, value of the variable remuneration, equity share, and returns. Quartiles
are determined based on the average values observed before the first robo introduction (August 2017). All
regressions include individual and time fixed effects. Controls include the account value in the previous month,
the value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy if the variable remuneration was received in the current
month and a dummy if the variable remuneration was received in the past month. Standard errors, clustered at
the individual level, are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 11: Control Group: Exposed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Connections Trading Inflows Equity Returns Static
Robo treated*after 0.261*** 0.216*** 75.72*** 0.0854*** 0.0396*** 0.00915***
(0.0155) (0.00140) (7.494) (0.00220) (0.00126) (0.000592)
Observations 797,443 1,477,329 1,477,329 1,415,310 1,333,971 1,333,971
R-squared 0.022 0.070 0.018 0.069 0.135 0.020
Number of Clusters 34,448 34,448 34,397 34,310 34,310 34,476
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions in which the control group are exposed
individuals who did not take the robo. In column 1, the dependent variable is the number of
connections per month; in column 2, the dependent variable is the number of allocation changes
per month; in column 3, the dependent variable is the net monthly inflow in euros; in column 4,
the dependent variable is the equity share; in columns 5, the dependents variable is the annual
return; In column 6, the dependent variable is the static effect as defined in equation (7). All
regressions include individual and time fixed effects. Controls include the account value in the
previous month, the value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy if the variable remuneration
was received in the current month and a dummy if the variable remuneration was received in the
past month. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 12: Control Group: Curious
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Connections Trading Inflows Equity Returns Static
Robo treated*after 0.266*** 0.210*** 73.25*** 0.0754*** 0.0563*** 0.0128***
(0.0152) (0.00138) (7.359) (0.00222) (0.00124) (0.000579)
Observations 815,775 1,650,285 1,650,285 1,595,684 1,487,612 1,487,612
R-squared 0.025 0.056 0.022 0.059 0.179 0.033
Number of Clusters 34,524 34,524 34,517 34,483 34,483 34,574
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions in which the control group are individuals
who expressed interest but did not take the robo (robo curious). In column 1, the dependent
variable is the number of connections per month; in column 2, the dependent variable is the number
of allocation changes per month; in column 3, the dependent variable is the net monthly inflow
in euros; in column 4, the dependent variable is the equity share; in columns 5, the dependents
variable is the annual return; In column 6, the dependent variable is the static effect as defined in
equation (7). All regressions include individual and time fixed effects. Controls include the account
value in the previous month, the value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy if the variable
remuneration was received in the current month and a dummy if the variable remuneration was
received in the past month. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 13: Intention to Treat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Connections Trading Inflows Equity Returns Static
Robo exposed*after 0.0420*** -0.00371*** 4.729 0.00720*** 0.0103*** 0.0153***
(0.0104) (0.000601) (6.795) (0.000468) (0.00188) (0.00150)
Observations 1,103,174 1,957,338 1,831,557 1,743,852 1,743,852 1,743,852
R-squared 0.024 0.014 0.006 0.101 0.433 0.016
Number of Clusters 48,043 48,043 47,958 47,717 47,717 48,079
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions in which the treatment are individuals who
have been proposed the robo service and the control are individuals who have not been exposed. In
column 1, the dependent variable is the number of connections per month; in column 2, the dependent
variable is the number of allocation changes per month; in column 3, the dependent variable is the net
monthly inflow in euros; in column 4, the dependent variable is the equity share; in columns 5, the
dependents variable is the annual return; In column 6, the dependent variable is the static effect as
defined in equation (7). All regressions include individual and time fixed effects. Controls include the
account value in the previous month, the value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy if the
variable remuneration was received in the current month and a dummy if the variable remuneration
was received in the past month. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 14: IV Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Connections Trading Inflows Equity Returns Static
Robo treated*after 0.135*** 0.146*** 234.9*** 0.118*** 0.0683*** 0.0514***
(0.0344) (0.00562) (25.08) (0.00449) (0.00572) (0.00379)
First Stage: Robo Treated
Fraction of treated employees 13.131*** 7.699*** 7.699*** 7.637*** 7.392*** 7.392***
(1.2902) (0.8995) (0.8995) (0.9135) (0.8457) (0.8457)
F-Stat (first stage) 103.57 73.26 73.26 69.9 76.4 76.4
Observations 780,112 1,554,438 1,554,438 1,450,851 1,362,797 1,362,797
R-squared (within) 0.028 0.053 0.015 0.063 0.104 0.011
Number of Clusters 334,431 34,431 34,398 34,241 34,241 34,441
Note: This table reports the results of 2SLS regressions in which the probability to adopt the robo service
is instrumented by the fraction of employees in the same firm who have taken-up the robo. In column 1,
the dependent variable is the number of connections per month; in column 2, the dependent variable is the
number of allocation changes per month; in column 3, the dependent variable is the net monthly inflow in
euros; in column 4, the dependent variable is the equity share; in columns 5, the dependents variable is
the annual return; In column 6, the dependent variable is the static effect as defined in equation (7). All
regressions include individual and time fixed effects. Controls include the account value in the previous
month, the value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy if the variable remuneration was received
in the current month and a dummy if the variable remuneration was received in the past month. Standard
errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
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8 Online Appendix
Table 15: Returns without Employer Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable Annual return alpha
Robo treated*after 0.0235*** 0.0218*** 0.00217** 0.0119*** 0.00516***







Observations 1,055,045 1,055,000 1,055,045 609,560 609,560
R-squared 0.038 0.038 0.640 0.122 0.005
Number of Clusters 34,241 34,241 34,241 32,485 32,485
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In columns 1-4, the depen-
dent variable is the annual returns without employer stock at the saving vehicle level.
In column 5, the dependent variable is the portfolio alpha without employer stock,
computed from the CAPM using as benchmark the returns of the funds across all
investors. All regressions include individual and time fixed effects. Controls include
the account value in the previous month, the value of the yearly variable remunera-
tion, a dummy if the variable remuneration was received in the current month and a
dummy if the variable remuneration was received in the past month. Standard errors,
clustered at the individual level, are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 16: Individual Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Connections Trading Inflows Equity Returns Static
Robo treated*after 0.296*** 0.263*** 129.1*** 0.0729*** 0.0197*** 0.00983***
(0.0169) (0.00230) (15.66) (0.00179) (0.00147) (0.000689)
Observations 782,234 782,234 782,234 777,832 740,462 740,462
R-squared 0.029 0.074 0.026 0.080 0.153 0.033
Number of Clusters 34,441 34,441 34,441 34,408 34,285 34,285
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions at the individual level, aggregating over
all contracts held by the same individual. In column 1, the dependent variable is the number of
connections per month; in column 2, the dependent variable is the number of allocation changes
per month; in column 3, the dependent variable is the net monthly inflow in euros; in column 4, the
dependent variable is the equity share; in columns 5, the dependents variable is the annual return;
In column 6, the dependent variable is the static effect as defined in equation (7). All regressions
include individual and time fixed effects. Controls include the account value in the previous
month, the value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy if the variable remuneration was
received in the current month and a dummy if the variable remuneration was received in the past
month. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 17: Cluster by Individual and Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Connections Trading Inflows Equity Returns Static
Robo treated*after 0.296*** 0.213*** 85.64*** 0.0866*** 0.0539*** 0.0200***
(0.0828) (0.0401) (24.10) (0.00386) (0.00905) (0.00436)
Observations 780,080 1,554,304 1,554,304 1,450,261 1,361,023 1,361,023
R-squared 0.595 0.330 0.073 0.932 0.568 0.577
Number of Clusters 34,400/26 34,400/26 34,353/26 34,175/26 34,175/26 34,410/26
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions in which standard errors are clustered both
by individual and by time (double clustering). In column 1, the dependent variable is the number
of connections per month; in column 2, the dependent variable is the number of allocation changes
per month; in column 3, the dependent variable is the net monthly inflow in euros; in column 4, the
dependent variable is the equity share; in columns 5, the dependents variable is the annual return;
In column 6, the dependent variable is the static effect as defined in equation (7). All regressions
include individual and time fixed effects. Controls include the account value in the previous month,
the value of the yearly variable remuneration, a dummy if the variable remuneration was received
in the current month and a dummy if the variable remuneration was received in the past month.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 18: Fraction of Takers and Firm Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Variable Age Female Assets Equity Returns Connect. Remuner.
Fraction of treated employees 3.123** -0.0264 1.289*** -0.0531 -0.00285 0.189 2,706***
(1.417) (0.0585) (0.395) (0.0485) (0.00195) (0.361) (564.6)
Sample Firms with at least one taker
Observations 762 762 732 732 722 736 744
R-squared 0.006 0.000 0.014 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.030
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. All dependent variables are defined as the firm-level
average before the first robo introduction (August 2017) while the fraction of treated employees is the firm-level
average after the firm’s exposure to the robo. The sample includes all firms with at least one robo-taker. In
column 1, the dependent variable is the average age of the employees; in column 2, the average gender ratio; in
column 3, the average portfolio value (in log); in column 4, the average equity share; in column 5, the average
portfolio returns; in column 6, the average number of connections; in column 7, the average value of the variable
remuneration. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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